My latest blog on SEBI's recent directives on Mutual Funds is here.  The post follows:
 
 
Assume we are living at a time when we
 still used boats to travel long distances. Imagine a large, leaky boat 
about to set out on a stormy sea. Imagine that this boat is about to 
make a journey that in the normal course will last over a year. 
Additionally, the boat has had a history of capsizing a few times in the
 past, often taking with it the passengers. However, each time, the 
owners are able to pull the boat out from the sea  put up a few patches 
 and declare it seaworthy. It would seem obvious that tickets for the 
trip would be hard to sell  especially to people staying in the vicinity
 of the port of launch.
Now imagine that there is a 
regulator whose job is to protect the passengers. The regulator is 
charged with certifying the sea-worthiness of the boat  so that the 
passengers have a safe journey. Over the years, seeing that the boat has
 not proven to be particularly safe, the regulator declares that all 
passengers have to decide for themselves what the journey is worth to 
them. Sellers of tickets are to be paid for their services directly by 
the passengers  not by the boat owners. Meanwhile, the seas become 
stormier, and ticket sales fall.
The boat owners now 
demand that the ticket prices should be raised (They obviously form a 
cartel  if you want to use the boats, you have to deal with them). This 
extra money is to be used partially for rewarding those who sell tickets
 to passengers. Importantly, more money is to be paid to those sellers 
who sell tickets to unsuspecting passengers, who live far away, and are 
therefore less likely to have heard of the experience of earlier 
passengers. Even more intriguingly, passengers who have already bought 
the tickets should be charged extra every time a "new" passenger from 
afar agrees to board the leaky boat. What should the regulator do?
It
 could of course ignore the lobbying of the boat owners, and insist that
 they spend money building a more robust boat. It could insist that boat
 owners pay more to cartographers who can help determine a less risky 
path to the destination. It could insist that buyers have a right to 
know that that besides the boat, there were other less dangerous paths 
to the destination as well. It could mandate the creation of boats that 
are safer. It could insist in fact, that their primary mandate was to 
protect the passenger, and not the well being of the boat owners.
What
 would you say of a regulator that instead, agrees whole heartedly with 
the boat owners, caps the payment to the cartographers, increases the 
price of the tickets and increases incentives for those getting 
unsuspecting passengers to the boat  even forcing existing passengers to
 pay more. Who am I talking about  replace "boat owners" with "Mutual 
Funds" and you have your answer.
Undoing its own logic
In
 2009, SEBI decided to ban entry loads for mutual funds  the argument 
then was that investors should determine for themselves what services of
 "fund advisors"  people who sold them funds  was worth to them. 
Investors could decide how much they would pay. A laudable objective.
This
 change effectively killed a whole range of distributors  where clearly,
 the investor did not feel that enough value was being added to be worth
 paying. Inflows into equity mutual funds fell as well. 
The moot point is whether the inflows fell as a result of
 poor market and fund performance or because of a lower distributor 
base. 
A look at the graph above shows that the 
problem is not that the assets did not increase. Just that equity fund 
assets did not grow. Most equity funds in the period post the ban of 
entry load (August 2009) have delivered poor returns to investors 
(category average for 3 years for equity large cap has been 4.5% per 
annum while even liquid debt funds have delivered 7% per annum). Since 
the equity markets have performed poorly, long-only funds too have 
performed poorly  some more so than others. Long-only refers to a 
situation where fund managers are only allowed to buy before they can 
sell. An alternative would be to sell first and then buy back at a lower
 price if the market were falling. Almost all mutual funds are 
"long-only". In such an environment, would it be expected that there 
would be a rush of investors into equity funds? Not in the view of this 
writer.
What therefore was the rationale to re-impose 
the entry load  which is what SEBI has mandated as per its latest 
guidelines? Under the guise of increasing investor participation, SEBI 
has made the following changes  (a) entry load has been increased if 
mutual funds were to raise money from centres other than the top 15. 
Astonishingly, it has allowed mutual funds to charge the extra load to 
other investors of the fund as well  not only the far-away ones (b) it 
has passed on the service tax that was earlier paid by the asset 
management company  to the investor (c) it has capped the brokerage that
 can be paid to the broker who provides research and trade execution to 
the fund house  and incidentally provides the fund manager the inputs to
 enable him or her to make investment decisions after considering 
multiple view points. 
The product is faulty, not the sales effort 
First
 and foremost, SEBI could have allowed mutual funds to have investment 
styles which are not only "long-only". The market offers enough 
instruments today to allow a skilful fund manager to trade both ways  
and generate "alpha". By allowing manager to only buy, the ability to 
sensibly exploit shorting opportunities is unavailable to managers. The 
recent Alternative investment fund guideline is a step in direction of 
allowing shorting as well, but the large ticket size per investor 
(currently Rs 1 crore is the minimum per investor) is a big entry 
barrier. 
Another could have been the ability to 
manage a multi-asset fund. Here of course the plethora of regulators 
offers an impediment. So we have the strange conundrum that each 
individual can be a "multi asset class hedge fund" by himself  there is 
no bar for an individual to trade in equity, commodity, currency, gold 
or real-estate, but no investment professional or fund house can offer 
such an investment vehicle to investors. A mutual fund cannot invest in 
commodities for example  an asset class that has done well in the same 
years that equity has performed poorly. But if this is the problem, 
should it not have been addressed?
Clearly this is a 
case where the wrong question has been posed and answered. Many 
representatives of mutual funds and distributors would have presented 
their view points to SEBI. I wonder how many investor associations did. 
The views expressed are the personal views of the author.    
 
 
