Global warming - still confusing

The climate change and global warming debate continues to remain confusing. Depending on what you read, the evidence on both sides seems overwhelming. Goes to show that when we are dealing with long data series which is itself derived out of various assumptions, the outcome will be what you want it to be.

An interesting article on the issues of calculating a "base temperature" to start with - and possible manipulation by the pro lobby.

Elections & Banking - Red Light Ahead

My last month's column for Wealth Insight:

While private banks are part of any investor’s portfolio, PSU banks have to remain a trading play 
While private banks are part of any investor’s portfolio, PSU banks have to remain a trading play

By Anand Tandon | Nov 24, 2012

The year 2012 has been and continues to be an election-heavy year – with 7 state assemblies completing their terms. Elections are a time when politicians are at their “promising best” – often promising voters rewards in the form of lower power tariffs, waiver of farm loans, and nowadays computers, TVs and other goodies. It is common knowledge that elections spoil rural credit culture: farmers wait for elections for waiver of overdue credit, and are too often rewarded with it. I recently came across a working paper published by Harvard Business School which offers some interesting insights. Authored by Shawn Cole (http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-001.pdf), the paper establishes some important points which have implications for investing in bank stocks.

Higher credit, but no increase in production
Using data for 32 elections conducted across 19 states over 8 years, Cole establishes that in an election year, agri-credit portfolio of state owned banks (PSU banks) increases 5-10 per cent. Private sector banks, on the other hand, do not reveal any such increase. This increase cannot be attributed to rainfall, population or any productivity-linked variable. Importantly, the paper establishes that increased credit does not result in increased output.

Higher defaults, and write-offs
Another related observation is that while the average increase in credit is 8 per cent, the increase (peak to trough) in defaults increases 16 per cent. While it should be expected that an increase in credit will lead to higher bad loans, the increase of 16 per cent is too high to be explained by just the rise in credit.
Data also reveals that post the election, the bad-loan percentage falls quickly. This is not because recoveries increase – the author suggests that the drop is a result of write-offs that the banks undertake to live up to the pre-election promises made by the politicians.

Higher benefits to areas where election results are uncertain
The areas that seem to get the largest bump up in credit are those that are viewed as being at the margin with regard to the ability of the ruling party to win elections. The study revealed that areas where the ruling party/coalition won by a margin of 15 per cent or more, received almost 5-6 per cent lower credit than those areas where the voting was closer. In other words, bank loans were being used as a means to “buy” votes in “swing” districts.

The “committed” voter received a different reward: he had his loans written off! Where the margin of victory exceeds 15 per cent, “forgiven” loans increase, leading to an almost 27 per cent drop in figures of delayed loans. Other areas, where the ruling party lost, do not witness such largess. The formula seems to be inducement before and reward after.

Implications for investing in banks
The paper re-establishes the notion that politicians will use whatever resources they can to win elections. It also explains why government of the day does not wish to reduce its investment in state owned banks to lower than 51 per cent, despite facing the daunting prospect of having to invest between Rs 1 trillion and Rs 2.5 trillion over the next ten years. This, despite the investment yielding poor returns – dividends to shareholders are lower than borrowing cost; capital gains are notional since policy does not allow equity to be sold since government holding is already near the 51 per cent threshold in many cases. After all, who would voluntarily wish to give up the means of “purchasing” voter goodwill.

Without going into the moral or ethical dilemma that this poses, what does this imply for the average investor?
It has long been known that whenever a new chairman takes charge, there is a sudden jump in the non-performing assets of banks. This is particularly true for state owned banks. SBI offered a great example at the last change of guard. Consequently, investing just after a new chairman takes over is hazardous for investors. Better to wait a couple of quarters for the “clean-up” to be visible.

To this, we now add another tool – whenever an election is due, state owned banks operating in that state will likely witness a sharp increase in agricultural credit in the year prior to the election, followed by increased write-offs. Consequently, investment in such banks is best avoided till atleast 6 months after the elections to enable the write-offs to work through the system.

The current year has seen a revival in the stock market. However, state owned banks have significantly underperformed. A combination of inadequate capital, larger exposure to poorly performing sectors, and consequently, higher re-structured loans have driven valuations to below stated book in most cases. In addition, it is possible that the market is already factoring in the decline that is likely in agri-credit portfolio for reasons stated earlier.

Inefficient capital allocation increase societal costs in many ways. Taxes have to increase to pay for government spend; including the capital required to be infused in banks. This is an indirect transfer from urban to rural India since farmers are not directly taxed. Another impact is lack of accountability of state owned banks for their performance resulting in below par customer experience and higher cost ratios. In a perverse way, the private banks benefit, since they gain a greater share of the market due to better product and service, despite having to work harder to raise capital which is “freely” available to their state owned competitors.

While private banks will form part of any investor’s portfolio, state owned banks have to remain a trading play. Consistent performance for state owned banks will have to wait till the level of government ownership and control falls to lower levels. However, given that politicians across the world attempt to use public institutions for private ends, it will be a long time coming.

CAG Reports and the Markets

My column for Wealth Insight on the CAG reports is here. The article is reproduced below

CAG deserves the kudos of all right- thinking Indians for raising the level of public debate

The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) is not a position most people in India have been familiar with. This changed recently when CAG reports repeatedly made headlines claiming massive loot of the public exchequer. In August, a multitude of reports hit the Parliament — all pointing out lacunae in government policy and putative losses. The government’s spin masters went to work quickly. While some attempted to show that the CAG reports overstepped their mandate, others challenged the content of reports — in particular, the attempt to quantify losses arising to the public from flawed implementation of policy. Yet others have attempted to question the motives of the CAG.

Irrespective of the outcome, Vinod Rai — the incumbent CAG – deserves the kudos of all right- thinking Indians for raising the level of public debate. Every once in a while, a leader comes along who uses the full power of a constitutional authority. The Election Commission underwent such a change under TN Seshan. I hope this continues even after Rai demits office.

Analysis is succinct yet comprehensive
CAG has released a number of reports. For want of space, I discuss only the report on Ultra Mega Power Projects (UMPP) here. The report — something I recommend all to read for its lucid and incisive analysis is available at http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Recent/Recent.html. If only analysts wrote as clearly and authoritatively!

The report makes several points with regard to the allocation of UMPP licences and related coal reserves:
# The government did not follow its own rules — starting with appointment of the bid consultant
# Terms of the bid were altered to suit certain bidders (in particular Reliance power or RPL, the eventual winner), by diluting requirements of ownership, investment, and experience
# Extra land was allotted despite a study to show that it was in excess. No effort was made to recover the land despite it being established that it was in excess
# Allotment of coal blocks were made — in excess of the requirement — despite having no justification or study to show the need
# The excess coal was allowed to be diverted to another project — tariff for which was already determined based on the need to buy coal. This clearly amounted to violation of bid conditions in favour of Reliance Power
# The report quotes from RPL’s own estimates which put the extra gain to the company from the allotted coal to the tune of Rs 29,000 crore It is worth recalling that Tata Power has a case pending in the Supreme Court challenging the use of coal allotted for Sasan for Chitrangi Project (as approved by the Empowered Group of Ministers, or EGOM).

The defence
RPL’s defence is simple. They are not responsible for the excess coal, that the allocation of the extra mine has been ratified by the EGOM twice — once in 2008, and again in 2012. There are also somewhat gratuitous comments suggesting that CAG’s recommendation of reviewing the allocation of coal would result in India continuing to remain short of coal.

The argument is self-serving. Of course the allotment of mines has to be a government decision! The mines belong to the public and are being allotted. To suggest that this happens without intervention of the beneficiary is to stretch credulity to the point of breaking. To assert that without the mines being allotted to RPL, India would remain short of coal is laughable. First, the mines have not yet started delivering anything. Also, there are other perfectly capable companies that can mine the coal, and would pay for it.

The government’s defence is even more pathetic. To the primary allegation of extra allotment, the ministry of power has responded that the Attorney General of India has opined that the decision of the EGOM in 2008 was “well considered” — and hence the recommendation of the CAG that the extra allotment be withdrawn, may be ignored. It begs the question on why the EGOM allotted the extra mine in the first place, and why it felt imperative to overrule the conditions of allotment. Sample this: ‘The coal produced from these mines would be exclusively used in the Sasan UMPP.’

The other points are even more wishy-washy — and have been torn down in the report of the CAG itself with arguments that seem perfectly reasonable.

Greater transparency: churn in the index
The reports will now be referred to the Public Accounts Committee, where the matter is unlikely to result in corrective action. Given that this cannot be blamed on allies (unlike the 3G imbroglio), it would result in serious embarrassment for an already embattled government.

However, it may and hopefully will, result in a new and clearer policy of allotment of natural resources, in particular coal. Short-term, this may result in even slower decision making. Our shortage of coal is likely to continue. Longer term, the challenge of allotment of scare resources — airwaves, coal and iron ore, and even concessions to operate airports and roads — is likely to become more streamlined. Clear policies will remove the politicians’ ability to “seek rent” — a polite term for extracting money from public goods. With that, infrastructure companies will be less attractive to secondary investors — as unpredictable upsides are unlikely to occur. This may result in another shake up in the index. Currently 40 per cent of the index capitalisation is from companies dependent on energy, coal, and steel — all industries benefiting from ability to influence government policy. A reduction of this number over the next decade will represent the coming of age of the Indian economy.

Manipulation by design

My take on central banking as it appears in Wealth Insight here. The article is reproduced below:

Barclay’s CEO, Bob Diamond, recently lost his job. In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England (BoE), telephoned Diamond. Tucker, apparently, indicated that Barclay’s Libor rate “did not always need to be as high as (they) have (been) recently”. Diamond passed on the message to his team — who took this as indication from the BoE to report lower rates — which they proceeded to do. Investigations of this “rigging” have so far led to resignations of the Chairman, CEO and COO of Barclays. Barclays has been fined £290 million for this attempted “manipulation”.

Can’t “fix” rates on your own
The Libor is calculated (fixed) by Thomson Reuters on behalf of the British Bankers’ Association by taking a poll of a panel of banks (16 banks for pound, 18 for USD) just prior to 11 AM. The survey asks banks the rates at which they “think” they can borrow. No actual transaction takes place. It is at best an “oligopolistic” rate — a “survey” rate. The four lowest and four highest rates are then eliminated and the Libor is calculated by taking an average of the rest. If Barclays was consistently reporting higher rates than the rest, it would have been eliminated. Even an “in sample” bank will have a weight of about 10 per cent. Overall, any single bank can skew the rate only by a few basis points (1/100th of a per cent) at best.

In markets where money moves freely across borders, rates in one currency cannot dramatically differ across borders. One way to check if the Libor was completely out of whack is to check its correlation with the T-bills rate in the US — the rate at which the US government borrows. The US T-bill rate in turn tracks the Fed Fund rate — a rate which the US Federal Reserve “manages” by intervention in the money markets (which includes printing dollars when needed). As the graph on the next page shows, barring the spike in 2008 (caused more by liquidity tightening post Lehman), there seems to be no systematic drift in the value of Libor vs T-bills.

The elephant in the room
Policy statements of Central Banks are watched carefully — for one primary reason. As the monopolistic printer of money, the Central Bank in any economy is in the business of managing (manipulating) interest rates. It is what they do. It is their mandate.

In 2008, a sharp fall in housing prices — caused in no small measure by the US Fed allowing an asset price bubble to be formed, led central banks the world over to lower interest rates. This increased asset prices, thereby shoring up the balance sheets of banks. This was manipulation — as is all policy “intervention” by Central Banks. In that context, Barclays executives cannot be faulted for doing what they thought their regulator wanted them to do. It seems strange logic that the bank is being penalised for working on the directions of the Bank of England.

Banks — more equal than others
In a recent interview to Business Line, Dr YV Reddy, the former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, is quoted as having said, “The government licenses banks to accept non-collateralised deposits — virtually telling people that your deposits are safe. The banks, in turn, agree to lend to government whenever the government wants. This is a compact. In some sense, it is the biggest con game going on”. The implied sovereign guarantee allows banks to leverage their balance sheet 10 times, magnifying the return on equity. The heightened risk is mitigated by the back-stop of the central bank. This sets up moral hazards. Bankers get incentivised for taking risks — if the risks materialise, the Central Bank steps in. Else, bankers receive outsize bonuses on profits from highly leveraged transactions.

Shared area indicate US recessions 2012 research.stlouisfed.org

Central Banks were set up with the objective to bring stability to the monetary system. In reality however, their intervention has led to increased volatility and boom and bust cycles. When the banks involved are “too big to fail”, the problem becomes that of the tax payers.

Unintended consequences
The power to manipulate markets is not easily controlled. Borrowers — corporations and consumers (home loans and consumption loans) — lobby central banks for lower rates irrespective of the economic situation. When was the last you heard a demand for higher interest rates when the economy was over-heating?
However, when growth slows, the clamour for lower rates rapidly rises.

Lobbying also ensures that shareholders are not penalised. In 2008 public money was liberally used to bail out banks in the US — directly through investment, and indirectly through monetary policy. The ownership of stressed banks and financial institutions remains with the original owners — a situation where profits are private and losses are public! Central planning for the economy has failed. Will centrally-planned monetary systems follow?

Whose side is SEBI on ?

My latest blog on SEBI's recent directives on Mutual Funds is here.  The post follows:

Assume we are living at a time when we still used boats to travel long distances. Imagine a large, leaky boat about to set out on a stormy sea. Imagine that this boat is about to make a journey that in the normal course will last over a year. Additionally, the boat has had a history of capsizing a few times in the past, often taking with it the passengers. However, each time, the owners are able to pull the boat out from the sea put up a few patches and declare it seaworthy. It would seem obvious that tickets for the trip would be hard to sell especially to people staying in the vicinity of the port of launch.

Now imagine that there is a regulator whose job is to protect the passengers. The regulator is charged with certifying the sea-worthiness of the boat so that the passengers have a safe journey. Over the years, seeing that the boat has not proven to be particularly safe, the regulator declares that all passengers have to decide for themselves what the journey is worth to them. Sellers of tickets are to be paid for their services directly by the passengers not by the boat owners. Meanwhile, the seas become stormier, and ticket sales fall.

The boat owners now demand that the ticket prices should be raised (They obviously form a cartel if you want to use the boats, you have to deal with them). This extra money is to be used partially for rewarding those who sell tickets to passengers. Importantly, more money is to be paid to those sellers who sell tickets to unsuspecting passengers, who live far away, and are therefore less likely to have heard of the experience of earlier passengers. Even more intriguingly, passengers who have already bought the tickets should be charged extra every time a "new" passenger from afar agrees to board the leaky boat. What should the regulator do?

It could of course ignore the lobbying of the boat owners, and insist that they spend money building a more robust boat. It could insist that boat owners pay more to cartographers who can help determine a less risky path to the destination. It could insist that buyers have a right to know that that besides the boat, there were other less dangerous paths to the destination as well. It could mandate the creation of boats that are safer. It could insist in fact, that their primary mandate was to protect the passenger, and not the well being of the boat owners.

What would you say of a regulator that instead, agrees whole heartedly with the boat owners, caps the payment to the cartographers, increases the price of the tickets and increases incentives for those getting unsuspecting passengers to the boat even forcing existing passengers to pay more. Who am I talking about replace "boat owners" with "Mutual Funds" and you have your answer.

Undoing its own logic

In 2009, SEBI decided to ban entry loads for mutual funds the argument then was that investors should determine for themselves what services of "fund advisors" people who sold them funds was worth to them. Investors could decide how much they would pay. A laudable objective.

This change effectively killed a whole range of distributors where clearly, the investor did not feel that enough value was being added to be worth paying. Inflows into equity mutual funds fell as well.

The moot point is whether the inflows fell as a result of poor market and fund performance or because of a lower distributor base.

A look at the graph above shows that the problem is not that the assets did not increase. Just that equity fund assets did not grow. Most equity funds in the period post the ban of entry load (August 2009) have delivered poor returns to investors (category average for 3 years for equity large cap has been 4.5% per annum while even liquid debt funds have delivered 7% per annum). Since the equity markets have performed poorly, long-only funds too have performed poorly some more so than others. Long-only refers to a situation where fund managers are only allowed to buy before they can sell. An alternative would be to sell first and then buy back at a lower price if the market were falling. Almost all mutual funds are "long-only". In such an environment, would it be expected that there would be a rush of investors into equity funds? Not in the view of this writer.

What therefore was the rationale to re-impose the entry load which is what SEBI has mandated as per its latest guidelines? Under the guise of increasing investor participation, SEBI has made the following changes (a) entry load has been increased if mutual funds were to raise money from centres other than the top 15. 

Astonishingly, it has allowed mutual funds to charge the extra load to other investors of the fund as well not only the far-away ones (b) it has passed on the service tax that was earlier paid by the asset management company to the investor (c) it has capped the brokerage that can be paid to the broker who provides research and trade execution to the fund house and incidentally provides the fund manager the inputs to enable him or her to make investment decisions after considering multiple view points.

The product is faulty, not the sales effort

First and foremost, SEBI could have allowed mutual funds to have investment styles which are not only "long-only". The market offers enough instruments today to allow a skilful fund manager to trade both ways and generate "alpha". By allowing manager to only buy, the ability to sensibly exploit shorting opportunities is unavailable to managers. The recent Alternative investment fund guideline is a step in direction of allowing shorting as well, but the large ticket size per investor (currently Rs 1 crore is the minimum per investor) is a big entry barrier.

Another could have been the ability to manage a multi-asset fund. Here of course the plethora of regulators offers an impediment. So we have the strange conundrum that each individual can be a "multi asset class hedge fund" by himself there is no bar for an individual to trade in equity, commodity, currency, gold or real-estate, but no investment professional or fund house can offer such an investment vehicle to investors. A mutual fund cannot invest in commodities for example an asset class that has done well in the same years that equity has performed poorly. But if this is the problem, should it not have been addressed?

Clearly this is a case where the wrong question has been posed and answered. Many representatives of mutual funds and distributors would have presented their view points to SEBI. I wonder how many investor associations did. 

The views expressed are the personal views of the author.

Seeking visionary leadership

My column of Wealth Insight released online on 28th July is here. Reproduced below

While it is wrong to blame democracy for slow growth, what India needs is a policy framework that creates a transparent environment

By Anand Tandon | Jul 28, 2012

A recent report by Kotak Institutional research serves to remind us of the need for growth. Basing his numbers on average income growth rates, the analyst concludes that 100mn additional households (i.e. half billion people) will remain in the “survivor” category by 2025 if GDP grows at 5% rather than at 9%. In other words, a growth rate slower by 4% per annum will consign approximately 7% of the world’s population to poverty over the next 13 years. Poverty that could have been avoided! High growth is incontrovertibly a desirable objective for any government.

Is democracy a hurdle?
Our erudite prime minister included, the current political class and “chatterati” blame India’s democracy for slower economic growth compared to China. This is without basis.

Yasheng Huang, a professor of Political economy at MIT delivered an excellent lecture at TED last year which I strongly urge the reader to listen to (http://www.ted.com/talks/yasheng_huang. html). Huang compares India’s growth with China and concludes that the growth differential arises less out of political structure and more out of differences in education and health parameters.

One of the interesting points that Huang makes is that India, during the period 1961-1991, had a dominant single party rule (less democracy, more autocracy – the Emergency being a case in point). During this period, the economy averaged a growth rate of 1.8%. Post 1991, with the first “minority” government, and under subsequent coalition governments, average growth for the next two decades has exceeded 5%. In itself, this should silence those who blame “fractious democracy” for slower growth as the data suggests exactly the opposite.

Data given in the below table is worth thinking about. In 1981, India had better rail coverage (a proxy for infrastructure) than China. However, India lagged significantly when it came to human indicators. Literacy in China (1985) was significantly higher – with women literacy more than two times that of Indian women. Perhaps that explains the higher life expectancy of the Chinese by more than a decade. Indian women had a life expectancy lower than that of men – in itself an unnatural situation. Post this decade, the difference in growth rate of China and India diverged significantly. If no other data is presented, would it not be logical to conclude that growth rate differentials are driven more by human capital, and less by the ability to set up infrastructure? Huang, in fact, concludes that infrastructure development is a result of economic development and not its cause. As the economy develops and generates savings, infrastructure improves.

Does “reform” only equal “FDI in retail”?
Indian “reform” started in the decade of the 90s with lower licensing requirements – allowing the Indian entrepreneur to use his talents as he sees fit. Trade barriers were lowered with lower import tariffs, forcing Indian industry to become more competitive.

Capital restrictions were reduced. This led to an increase in foreign inflows within the country – and, of late, overseas investments by Indian corporations. Another factor of production, i.e. “capital”, was unshackled.

Human Development vs Infrastructure Development  India  China Infrastructure   Railways (1981) Km 61,240 53,900 Electrified Railways (1981) Km 5,345 1,700 Human Capital   Adult Literacy Rate(1991) 48.20% 77.80% Women Literacy (1991) 33.70% 68% Life Expectancy Men (1985) (yrs) 57 68 Life Expectancy Women (1985) (yrs) 56 70 Source: Presentation of Y Huang

Two other economic factors of production – “land” (which, in economic terms, includes all natural resources) and “labour”, have, however, escaped any significant “reform”. We therefore have a situationwhere, though consumption demand in India remains strong, supply is restricted. In fact, the country has to rely on imports to meet its demand. Supply increase, which should act as automatic stabiliser to increased demand and fuel growth, is restricted by land and labour laws that are cumbersome and archaic.

Despite this, calls for economic reform restrict themselves to allowing “FDI in retail” as a magic formula to erase all ills that afflict the economy. This can partially be put down to vested interests of analysts – most employed by “sell side” brokerages – who mouth what their clients want them to – i.e., greater market access. However, one wonders about the compulsions of the writers of the Economic Survey, who also repeatedly dish out the same formula, while remaining silent on the market destroying features of the proposed “land reform” bill, or the lack of clear policy in handling out natural resources for use by industry.

Needed: A focus on factors other than capital
Running a government is complex. More so, in a large, diversified country like India. Any leader can get overwhelmed by the enormity of the task. But, as I stated in the beginning, slow growth destroys opportunities for 7% of the humanity. A visionary leader would focus on one or two issues in a term of 5 years – issues that can unleash the potential of millions of his countrymen and women. Education and health are two such issues. Natural resource is another.

True reform would be to provide a policy framework, and create a transparent environment where the Indian entrepreneur can use these factors of production to further the goal of economic growth – and generate employment. Providing “entitlements” to people without empowering them to reach their own potential is the hallmark of bureaucracy, not leadership.

What to expect from the new CEA

I have a new blogpost on CNN-IBN's India Blog site. The link is here. I am also copying the blogpost below:

Last week, the Indian government appointed Dr Raghuram Rajan, a distinguished economist, as its chief economic adviser (CEA). The CEA advises the government on possible policy options and priorities. There are no executive responsibilities other than to prepare the various economic reports that are presented to Parliament - including the Economic Survey. In this context, it may be useful to look at the policy preferences of the new CEA.

In April, Rajan made a speech in New Delhi in the presence of the PM where he signed off with "I have been frank as an academic, that is the only value I bring". This suggests that perhaps he thought that his speech would not be to the liking of his listeners. But was it really that radical?

The speech (along with my somewhat liberal translation for the non-economists) identifies some issues with recent economic policy:

"Rent, patronage, or entitlement enhancing measures have sailed through."

"Private consumption, especially in rural areas, is growing strongly on the back of rising incomes, strong credit growth and continuing government transfers and subsidies. The result: The gap between our spending and our saving is making us dependent on short term foreign inflows to a dangerously high extent."

My translation:

Policy paralysis led to bureaucratic/political adhocism, encouraging corruption. India's unwashed masses have been satisfied through hand-outs in the form of subsidies for which there is no apparent way to fund.

The Government has raised minimum support prices for agri commodities at much higher rates than the rate of inflation. Along with free hand-outs (referred above), and forced lending to rural sector through compulsory priority sector lending, we are consuming well over what we save. Soon we will need China to fund us!

So far, I see no problems with the diagnosis. The problem starts now!

Rajan says: "We need a common minimum programme across all sensible political parties to ensure that we stabilise the economy and foreign investor perceptions quickly."

Here we have it. By implication, democracy in India is a problem. If you don't agree with policy wonks of the government, you are not "sensible", and foreign investors are more important than local.

In reality, democracy is good for the economy as are policy disagreements. Enough data exists to prove it. One example is that India's growth rate has gone UP significantly in the period since we have had coalitions ruling the country.

Additionally, most large Indian houses have been investing overseas (perhaps in quanta at least as large as inflows) over the past few years. That should cause policy makers to pause and see why domestic industry does not see the potential in India while we are supposed to invite foreigners.

Rajan goes on to suggest that by 2000's, "powerful elements of the political class which had never been fully convinced about giving up rents from the License Raj ..., had by then formed an unholy coalition with aggressive business people ..... The new post-License Raj equilibrium became the Resource Raj."

The statement is misleading seeming as it does to suggest that the unholy politician/industry alliance is new. When did India ever have a strategy to offer national resources in a transparent manner? It was always through licensing which is by its nature open to corruption. Only difference this time the scale of corruption is unprecedented under the current dispensation.

So what is the solution that Rajan prescribes? He says, "simply moving our millions from low productivity agriculture to rural industry or services will give us growth for years to come, provided we are willing to do the minimum necessary to collect the low hanging fruit."

How do we do this? "We need to liberalise sectors like education, retail and the press, freeing entry and improving customer choice. We need to transform more government-owned firms into well-managed publicly owned firms which are free from political influence or government support. And we need to evolve transparent means of pricing and allocating the bountiful natural resources in our country."

Get the connection? Huh? Well I don't too. How does letting foreign investment in the press, retail or higher education (he speaks of higher education, not primary, when he speaks of liberalisation somewhere else in the speech) help in increasing rural industry or services? Privatisation of government-owned companies has already been ruled out of the policy tool box of the current government and is unlikely to find its way back.

Unfortunately, the rest of the prescriptions too don't offer anything new: increase fuel prices (instead of curtailing wasteful government expenditure), find a policy for allocation of natural resources (non contestable except that no format has been suggested, so this is a motherhood statement and no more) and look out for foreign investors (I fail to see why it is not necessary to be kind to Indian investors as well).

So far, what one sees of the new CEA seems to be only old wine in new bottle. Worse, it does not seem to be based on fact or cogency of argument. Hopefully the reality will be better for India's economic future.